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The standard patent term of twenty years minimum, for any and all
products, as established by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), 1 may seem like it
is set in stone: a fixed and final length never again to be adjusted.
However, the historical reality of patent terms is that they have
evolved over time. In the United States, the original patent term was
determined on a case-by-case basis, with an upper limit of fourteen
years under the first U.S. Patent Act, in 1790. 2 This term was
* Simon Lester is the Associate Director and Huan Zhu is a research associate at
Cato’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies.
1. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art.
33, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS] (setting out the standards
and enforcement of intellectual property rights).
2. Patent Act of 1790, ch.7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109–112 (“[I]it shall and may be lawful
to and for the Secretary of State, the Secretary for the department of war, and the
Attorney General, or any two of them . . . to cause letters patent to be made out in
the name of the United States . . . and thereupon granting to such petitioner or
petitioners, his, her or their heirs, administrators or assigns for any term not
exceeding fourteen years, the sole and exclusive right and liberty of making,
constructing, using and vending to others to be used, the said invention or
discovery.”).
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prolonged through the possibility of a single seven-year extension,
under special circumstances, by the 1836 Patent Act, 3 and later
changed to a fixed length of seventeen years in 1861. 4 Eventually, this
was replaced by a twenty-year term 5 for all patents through the signing
of the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 6 which implemented the
TRIPS Agreement into U.S. law. 7
On the surface, the current patent term may look like the product of
decades of careful refinement. In reality, though, its origins and
current length have little evidentiary basis. Long and uniform patent
terms have come under increasing criticism from economists and other
experts. In this paper, we review both the history of and recent
thinking on the appropriate patent term length.
Section I of the paper examines the history and origins of the patent
term. Section II discusses the negotiating history of patent terms under
the TRIPS Agreement. Section III reviews the analyses of patent terms
by economists and other experts in recent decades. The final section
concludes.

I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PATENT TERMS
A. ENGLISH ORIGINS OF U.S. PATENTS
The notion of a monopoly on the sale of a particular product
originated in England during the sixteenth century as a royal grant of
a privilege to trade. 8 Under this system, the privilege to trade a specific
good was determined by the King. 9 Theoretically, his determination
was based on his view of the social value of the invention as well as
the amount of effort the inventor had put into his product. 10 Although
in practice, there was often corruption and abuse, which led to
3. See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 5, 5 Stat. 117, 125.
4. See Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 88, § 16, 12 Stat. 246, 249.
5. See TRIPS art. 33, supra note 1.
6. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2017).
7. See discussion infra Part II.
8. See Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: A History of Anglo-American Intellectual
Property 9 (June 2005) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Harvard Law School),
https://law.utexas.edu/faculty/obracha/dissertation/.
9. See id.
10. See id.
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monopolies that were considered detrimental to the public good. 11 As
a result, a movement to impose limits on the King’s power emerged. 12
Eventually, this led to the enactment of the Statute of Monopolies of
1624, which eliminated most monopolies but allowed a monopoly of
no more than fourteen years if the product was new and original. 13
How the legislature decided on the fourteen-year term remains
unclear and the subject of speculation. The most common view is that
the fourteen-year patent term was based on the standard
apprenticeship term, which was seven years. 14 At the time, most
inventions and new ideas were created and put into practice by
craftsmen. 15 The King granted them the exclusive right to implement
such inventions as a reward to their time and effort. 16 However, such
exclusive right was not unconditional. In return for such a right,
craftsmen, who were sometimes foreign, had to train some native
apprentices so that the locals could learn the technology and widely
use it after the apprenticeship ended. 17
11. See id. at 11.
12. See id. at 27.
13. Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.) (“[A]ny declaration before
mentioned shall not extend to any Letters Patents and Grants of Privilege for the
term of fourteen years or under, hereafter to be made of, the sole working or making
of any manner of new manufactures within this realm, to the true and first inventor
and inventors of such manufactures, which others at the time of making such Letters
Patents and Grants shall not use, so as also they be not contrary to the law, nor
mischievous to the state . . . [t]he said fourteen years to be accounted from the date
of the first Letters Patents, or Grant of such Privilege hereafter to be made, but that
the same shall be of such force as they should be, if this Act had never been made,
and of none other.”).
14. See Edward C. Walterscheid, Defining the Patent and Copyright Term: Term
Limits and the Intellectual Property Clause, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 315, 326 (2000).
15. See DAVID FULTON, THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO PATENTS, TRADE
MARKS, AND DESIGNS 5 (3d ed. 1905) (noting that in some instances an
apprenticeship was required before the person could exercise the art to his or her
own advantage).
16. See Walterscheid, Defining the Patent and Copyright Term: Term Limits and
the Intellectual Property Clause, supra note 14, at 326.
17. See FULTON, supra note 15, at 5 (“[I]f the inventor of a new manufacture
trained an apprentice in the art for seven years, it was but just that he should have
the services of the skilled workman, at skilled workman’s wages, for another seven
years, before the pupil should be at liberty to exercise the art for his own personal
advantage. Indeed, under the earliest practice it was customary to insert a proviso in
the grant, requiring the inventor to take apprentices during the last seven years of the
term, if he had not done so before.”); see also Marketa Trimble, Patent Working
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In this way, the apprenticeship term became the basis of the patent
term. There are still different theories about why the patent term is
twice as long as the length of an apprenticeship. Some have said that
fourteen years prevents an apprentice from stealing the master’s trade
secrets right away after his apprenticeship ends or competing with the
master too soon. 18 Others believe that the fourteen-year term could
provide the inventor enough time to train multiple generations of
apprentices, who can later carry out the technology and put it into
broader application. 19 Regardless, the apprenticeship term became the
Requirements: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
483, 497–98 (2016).
18. See Sean M. O’Connor, The Lost “Art” of the Patent System, 4 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1397, 1477 (2015).
19. See SHEETAL THAKUR, PATENTING IN INDIA 61 (2014) (“After the enactment
of Statute of Monopolies, the development of the law was left to the courts with few
interventions by parliament until 1883. It was soon decided that a patentee must do
something to make it possible for others to carry out the manner after the monopoly
had expired. At first, it appears to have been sufficient if the patentee trained two
apprentices who could later carry out the method. The time period of training an
apprentice as seven years and the time taken for training two apprentices, i.e. 14
years, came to be equated with term of patent.”); see also O’Connor, supra note 18,
at 1477 n.520 (“Some commentators have speculated that this is where the early
patent terms of 14 and 21 years come from. As multiples of seven, which was the
number of years of a standard apprenticeship, the period of exclusivity would last
through at least two generations of apprentices. This would both keep the master’s
apprentices from competing with him too soon (limiting the value of his patent grant)
and keep the master training successive generations of apprentices in order to keep
his grant.”); Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Free Trade in Patented Goods:
International Exchange for Patents, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 317, 336 n.84 (2014)
(noting that some scholars have suggested that since the length of an apprenticeship
is seven years, the purpose of the fourteen-year patent term was to teach several
generations of apprentices, and also noting that the term limit was perhaps a
compromise between those who preferred a traditional monopoly term of twentyone years and those who favored a term of seven years to equal the length of a single
apprenticeship); C. Michael White, Why a Seventeen Year Patent?, 38 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC’Y 839, 841 (1956) (stating that the United States originally adopted the
fourteen-year period then followed in England, which had been based on the time
required for a craftsman to train two new sets of apprentices; the seventeen-year
grant, now in effect, is the result of a compromise reached when an effort was made
to extend the time to twenty years in lieu of the seven-year renewal then allowed);
David Rogers, The History, Purpose and Benefits of Patents, SNELL & WILMER
(Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.swlaw.com/assets/pdf/news/2016/04/05/2016 (“The
17-year period was based on the colonial apprentice-master relationship. In colonial
America, the custom (adopted from Britain) was that an apprentice worked for a
master for 7 years before he was qualified as a tradesman. It was also custom that
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foundation of the patent term. One apprenticeship term was too short,
but three terms was too long. Two was just right. According to the
Statute of Apprentices of 1563, an apprenticeship was seven years. 20
Hence, fourteen years became the standard patent term. 21

B. THE EARLY U.S. HISTORY OF PATENT TERMS
Prior to the American revolution and subsequent independence
from Great Britain, some of the colonial legislatures and assemblies
were issuing patents. 22 However, the English Statute of Monopolies
was not always followed. For instance, patent terms varied from as
little as two years to twenty-one years in states such as Connecticut
and Massachusetts. 23
After the revolution, several states took over the role of issuing
patents. 24 For instance, between 1779 and 1791, there were twentythree state patents granted, 25 without enactment of a dedicated patent
law. The only state that formally addressed patent rights prior to the
U.S. Constitution was South Carolina in the Copyright Statute of
1784. 26 This law stated that “[i]nventors of useful machines shall have
a like exclusive privilege of making or vending their machines for the
like terms of 14 years, under the same privileges and restrictions
hereby granted to, and imposed on authors of books.” 27 In practice,
some patents were granted for as short as five years, at least until 1786,
the apprentice would not practice a secret learned from the master for two
apprenticeship periods (i.e., 7 + 7, or 14 years).”).
20. See Statute of Artificers, 1563, 5 Eliz., c. 4 (Eng.).
21. See Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.).
22. See Edward C. Walterscheid, Charting a Novel Course: The Creation of the
Patent Act of 1790, 25 AIPLA Q. J. 445, 451 (1997).
23. See Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent
and Copyright Clause, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 909, 919 (2002)
(explaining that several colonies enacted anti-monopoly statutes except to the extent
a new invention justified protection by granting an exclusive right to the inventor).
24. See Walterscheid, Charting a Novel Course: The Creation of the Patent Act
of 1790, supra note 22, at 452–53.
25. Id. at 452 n.28 (“Bugbee is the best extant source; he lists some 23 state
patents as having been granted between 1779 and 1791 . . . He limits his coverage,
however, to so-called patents of invention and excludes patents for importation.
Even including patents of importation, it is unlikely that more than 30 patents were
granted during this period.”).
26. Id.
27. See Bracha, supra note 8, at 111–12.
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when fourteen years became a universal patent term among state
patents. 28
The U.S. Constitution nationalized this issue and gave Congress the
power over patents. 29 However, the Constitution does not provide any
details on term length. Soon after ratification, Congress passed the
Patent Act of 1790, adopting a patent term of up to fourteen years. 30
Because there was no discussion on patent term length in the First
Federal Congress, and the fact that Statute of Monopolies of 1624 is
considered the cornerstone of American patent law, 31 the fourteenyear patent term is likely inherited from the Statute of Monopolies.
Although the statute leaves open the possibility of shorter patent
terms, there is no evidence of any patent term of less than fourteen
years. A patent classification analysis published by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) notes that the “[e]xpiration dates for this
time period are not available. 32
Toward the end of the fourteenth year from when patents were first
granted under the Patent Act of 1790, many inventors started to
complain that the patent term was insufficient to realize profits on their
inventions. 33 After considering the option of enacting a general
renewal term of between seven and fourteen years for patents, or the
extension of the patent term on a case by case basis, Congress chose

28. See Ochoa & Rose, supra note 23, at 922.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power to . . . promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
30. See Patent Act of 1790, ch.7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109-112 (“It shall and may be lawful
to and for the Secretary of State, the Secretary for the department of war, and the
Attorney General, or any two of them . . . to cause letters patent to be made out in
the name of the United States . . . thereupon granting to such petitioner or petitioners,
his, her or their heirs, administrators or assigns for any term not exceeding fourteen
years.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James Madison) (noting that the
protection of arts and sciences promotes the public welfare).
31. See Ramon A. Klitzke, Historical Background of the English Patent Law, 41
J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 615, 615 (1959).
32. See Alan C. Marco et al., The USPTO Historical Patent Data Files 10
(USPTO, Working Paper No. 2015-1, 2015).
33. See Tyler T. Ochoa, Patent and Copyright Term Extension and the
Constitution: A Historical Perspective, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 19, 52
(2001).
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the latter. 34 To provide more guidelines, Congress passed a statute in
1832 specifying the conditions under which it would consider an
extension. 35 Applicants were requested to provide information,
including the grounds of the application, a statement of the
“ascertained value” of the invention, and the “receipts and
expenditures” of the patentee. 36 Such applications would not
necessarily lead to a grant of extension, 37 and an extension would still
need a special act by Congress. 38 Between 1808 and 1836, Congress
issued a total of eleven patent extension statutes upon the requests of
the patent holders. 39
The Patent Act of 1836 officially codified the patent term extension
process. 40 While it retained the initial fourteen-year patent term, it
included a procedure by which the Commissioner of the Patent Office
could extend a patent for seven more years upon request. 41 The request
filed by the patent holder should demonstrate a lack of “reasonable
remuneration for the time, ingenuity, and expense.” 42 Unfortunately,
the historical data on which patents were extended did not survive. 43
The extension process proved to be burdensome to the
Commissioner of the Patent Office. As a compromise on the issue of
patent term length, through the Patent Act of 1861, Congress settled
on a flat term of seventeen years without any extension, starting from
the date of issue of the patent. 44

34. See id. (noting that Congress preferred a renewal of extension to depend on
the particular patent, not a fixed term of protection).
35. Id.
36. See Act of July 3, 1832, ch. 162, § 2, 1 Stat. 558, 559.
37. Robert P. Merges & Glenn H. Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright
and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. LEGIS. 45, 60 (2000) (stating that most requests for
patent extensions have traditionally been denied).
38. Id.
39. Ochoa, supra note 33, at 52.
40. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 18, 5 Stat. 117.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Alan C. Marco et al., supra note 32, at 12 (stating that much of the patent
historical data and classification information was either missing or destroyed prior
to 1840).
44. Ochoa, supra note 33, at 53.
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II. NEGOTIATING HISTORY OF THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT
The seventeen-year U.S. term continued until the issue was
discussed during the Uruguay Round trade talks. 45 Article 27.1 of the
TRIPS Agreement prevents discrimination against patents in
particular fields, 46 and Article 33 then sets out a minimum patent term
of twenty years. 47 As a result of these rules, taken together,
governments must provide at least twenty years of patent protection to
all “fields of technology.” 48 These rules reflect international
obligations, and thus give off an air of consensus and certainty.
However, the negotiations over these rules make clear that there were,
in fact, a wide range of opinions on these issues. 49
Prior to the Uruguay Round negotiation, which began in 1986,
approximately fifty countries, mostly developing, did not have patent
protection for pharmaceutical products. 50 Additionally, a portion of the
remaining countries only allowed patents of pharmaceutical processes
but not the actual products. 51 During the negotiation, the focus of
Article 27.1 was the scope and exemptions of patentable subject
matter. 52 The term, “non-discrimination,” was introduced into the
negotiation as a reflection of core General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) principles, 53 such as national treatment and mostfavorable nation (MFN), as proposed by the European Union (EU) and

45. See Patricia Montalvo, How Will the New Twenty-Year Patent Term Affect
You? A Look at the Trips Agreement and the Adoption of a Twenty-Year Patent
Term, 12 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L. J. 139, 140, 142 (1996) (describing the shift
in the U.S. patent term from a seventeen to a twenty-year term under the GATT
implementing legislation).
46. TRIPS art. 27, supra note 1.
47. Id. art. 33.
48. Id. arts. 27, 33.
49. See TERENCE STEWART, THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND A NEGOTIATING
HISTORY 474 (1986–1994).
50. The TRIPS Agreement and Pharmaceuticals, ASEAN WORKSHOP ON THE
TRIPS AGREEMENT AND ITS IMPACT ON PHARMACEUTICALS 11 (May 2–4, 2000),
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/en/d/Jh1459e/.
51. Id. at 7.
52. TRIPS art. 27, supra note 1.
53. See GATT Secretariat, Meeting of Negotiating Group of 12–14 July 1989, ¶
3, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/14 (Sept. 12, 1989).
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Switzerland. 54 Both developing and developed countries expressed the
intent to incorporate non-discrimination into the TRIPS Agreement as
a fundamental principle, while there were some discussions over the
scope and exceptions of the non-discrimination and MFN principles. 55
The term “discrimination” was not inserted into the patentable subject
matter clause of Article 27.1 until the final version. 56 The concept of
non-discrimination among the field of technology, which raised the
question of whether certain industries should be exempted from
TRIPS and therefore enjoy more flexible patent protection among
member states, was discussed throughout the negotiation history under
the issue of patentable subject matter. 57
Looking into the negotiating history of the TRIPS Agreement, it
was clear that the participants were divided on the issues of subject
matter and patent term. 58 Some countries, mostly developing
countries, proposed excluding pharmaceutical products from patenteligible subject matter either by explicitly listing it in the patent
exemptions 59 or by incorporating a general exemption clause to give
states the leeway to exclude other categories of inventions on the
grounds of national interest and public health. 60 Most of these
54. Id. ¶¶ 51, 85 (proposing commitments on the application of nondiscrimination, MFN, and national treatment principles).
55. See GATT Secretariat, Meeting of Negotiating Group of 14–16 May 1990,
¶ 17, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/21 (June 22, 1990); see also GATT Secretariat,
Meeting of Negotiating Group of 5–6 February 1990, ¶¶ 14, 20, GATT Doc.
MTN.GNG/NG11/18 (Feb. 27, 1990).
56. TRIPS art 27, supra note 1.
57. See Standards and Principles Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of
Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, Communication from India, ¶¶ 19–20,
GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/37 (July 10, 1989) [hereinafter Communication
from India 1989]; see also Communication from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China,
Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania and Uruguay, arts. 3–4,
GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/71 (May 14, 1990) [Communication from
Argentina et al.]; see infra notes 58–61.
58. See STEWART, supra note 49, at 474.
59. See Communication from India 1989, supra note 57 ¶ 18 (noting India and
Spain’s suggestions that the GATT Negotiating Group consider developing
countries’ exclusion of food, pharmaceuticals, and chemical products from
patentability).
60. See Communication from Argentina et al. art. 4, supra note 57 (setting forth
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Peru,
Tanzania and Uruguay’s exemption clause precluding patent protection for
inventions whose use would adversely affect public health).
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countries also proposed a flexible patent duration determined by
national interests in each country in either their draft proposals or
discussions during the negotiation meeting. 61
Proposals from the developed countries took a different view on
these two issues. The United States, 62 European Communities (now
EU), 63 Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden), 64

61. See Standards and Principles Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of
Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, Communication from Colombia, art. 41,
GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/TRIPS/W/2 (Oct. 16, 1991); see also Communication from
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Peru,
Tanzania and Uruguay, art. 4(3), GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/71 (May 14,
1990); Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Communication from Mexico, ¶ 3, GATT
Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/60 (Jan. 22, 1990); Negotiating Group on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods,
Communication from Brazil, ¶ 21, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/57 (Dec. 11,
1989); Guidelines for Negotiations that Strike a Balance Between Intellectual
Property Rights and Development Objectives, Communication from Peru, ¶ 1.4,
GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/45 (Oct. 27, 1989); Communication from India
1989, supra note 57, ¶¶ 18, 26.
62. See Draft Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Communication from the United States, art. 2(1)(a), GATT Doc.
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/70 (May 11, 1990) [hereinafter Communication from the
United States]; see also Suggestion by the United States for Achieving the
Negotiating Objective, Revision, ¶ 3, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/14/Rev.1
(Oct. 17, 1988) [hereinafter Suggestion by the United States].
63. See Draft Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Communication from the European Communities, art. 10(1), GATT Doc.
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/68 (Mar. 29, 1990) [hereinafter Communication from the
European Communities].
64. Proposal by the Nordic Countries for the Negotiations on Standards and
Principles for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, ¶ 1.1, GATT
Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/36 (July 10, 1989) [hereinafter Proposal by the Nordic
Countries].
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Australia, 65 Switzerland, 66 New Zealand, 67 Canada, 68 Korea, 69 Japan, 70
and Hong Kong 71 proposed to include all fields of technology in the
TRIPS Agreement. On the matter of patent duration, there was some
divergence between the countries. Australia and New Zealand
historically had shorter patent terms and therefore advocated patent
terms of fifteen and sixteen years respectively. 72 Others suggested a
fixed term of twenty years or higher. 73
65. Standards and Norms for Negotiations on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Communication from Australia, ¶ 1, GATT Doc.
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/35 (July 10, 1989) [hereinafter Communication from
Australia].
66. Draft Amendment to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade on the
Protection of Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, Communication from
Switzerland, art. 229(2)–(3), GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/73 (May 14, 1990)
[hereinafter Communication from Switzerland - Draft Amendment]; Standards and
Principles Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of Trade-Related Intellectual
Property Rights, Communication from Switzerland, ¶¶ 1.1–1.2, GATT Doc.
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/38 (July 11, 1989) [hereinafter Communication from
Switzerland - Standards and Principles].
67. Standards and Principles for Negotiations on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights, Communication from New Zealand, ¶ 1, GATT Doc.
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/46 (Oct. 24, 1989) [hereinafter Communication from New
Zealand].
68. Standards for Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, Submission from
Canada, ¶ A(4), GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/47 (Oct. 25, 1989) [hereinafter
Submission from Canada].
69. Standards and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, Communication
from the Republic of Korea, ¶ 2.1.1, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/48 (Oct. 26,
1989) [hereinafter Communication from Republic of Korea].
70. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Main Elements of a Legal Text for Trips,
Communication from Japan, ¶ 2.1.1, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/74 (May 15,
1990) [hereinafter Communication from Japan - Main Elements]; Negotiating Group
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
Counterfeit Goods, Submission by Japan, Addendum, ¶ 3, GATT Doc.
MTN.GNG/NG11/W/17/Add.1 (Sept. 23, 1988) [hereinafter Submission by Japan Addendum].
71. Standards for Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, Submission from
Hong Kong, ¶¶ 11–13, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/51 (Nov. 29, 1989)
[hereinafter Submission from Hong Kong].
72. Communication from New Zealand, supra note 67, ¶ 3; Communication
from Australia art. 5, supra note 65.
73. Communication from Japan - Main Elements, supra note 70, ¶ 4;
Communication from Switzerland - Draft Amendment art. 231(1), supra note 66;
Communication from the United States art. 25, supra note 62; Communication from

Country
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Patent-eligible Subject Matter
Pharmaceutical Pharmaceutical
products
products
excluded or left included
to the
discretion of
states

Patent Term
Less than 20 years or
20 years
more

India, Spain,
Brazil, Mexico,
Peru, Argentina,
Chile, China,
Colombia,
Cuba, Egypt,
Nigeria,
Tanzania, and
Uruguay

Australia
and New
Zealand

United States,
European
Community,
Nordic countries,
Australia,
Switzerland, New
Zealand, Canada,
Korea, Japan, and
Hong Kong

United
States,
European
Community,
Nordic
countries,
Switzerland,
Canada,
Korea,
Japan, and
Hong Kong

Left to the
discretion
of states

India,
Spain,
Brazil,
Mexico,
and Peru

The negotiating texts reflected these different views. In an informal
draft text in 1990, the patent scope was close to the final version of the
TRIPS Agreement. 74 The clause of patentable subject matter
confirmed that all industries should be given the patent protection,
which covered pharmaceutical and medical products (although there
was no mention of non-discrimination): 75
1.1 Patents shall be [available] [granted] for [any inventions, whether
products or processes, in all fields of technology,] [all products and
processes] which are new, which are unobvious or involve an inventive step

the European Communities art. 25, supra note 63; Submission from Hong Kong,
supra note 71, ¶ 29; Communication from Republic of Korea, supra note 69, ¶ 1.2;
Submission from Canada, supra note 68, ¶ A(5); Communication from Switzerland
- Standards and Principles, supra note 66, ¶ 1.3; Proposal by the Nordic Countries,
supra note 64, ¶ 1.4; Suggestion by the United States, supra note 62, ¶ 3; Submission
by Japan - Addendum, supra note 70, ¶ 3.
74. See generally Status of Work in the Negotiating Group, Chairman’s Report
to the GNG, GATT Doc. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76 (July 23, 1990) (containing a
“compilation of the options for legal commitments” suggested during negotiations
to be considered for review).
75. Id. ¶ 5.1.1.
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and which are useful or industrially applicable. 76

By contrast, the patent term clause was less settled. Several
possibilities for this clause were included in the draft, reflecting the
negotiation process and the prevalent views at the time:
4A.1 The term of protection shall be [at least] [15 years from the date of
filing of the application, except for inventions in the field of
pharmaceuticals for which the term shall be 20 years] [20 years from the
date of filing of the application] [or where other applications are invoked
in the said application, 20 years from the filing date of the earliest filed of
the invoked applications which is not the priority date of the said
application].
4A.2 PARTIES are encouraged to extend the term of patent protection in
appropriate cases, to compensate for delays regarding the exploitation of
the patented invention caused by regulatory approval processes.
4B It shall be a matter for national legislation to determine the duration of
protection. 77

After this draft, two more changes were made before the parties
finalized the TRIPS Agreement’s text. Other than the general language
that grants patent protection to every sector, Article 27.1 also included
a non-discrimination clause to ensure the equal protection in all fields
of technology. 78 With regard to the patent term length, a twenty-year
fixed term, advocated by the U.S., prevailed. 79 Developing countries
were convinced that they would benefit by gaining access to markets
for agricultural and textile products under the World Trade
Organization (WTO) treaties as a tradeoff for raising the intellectual
property (IP) protection standard. 80 Another reason that they were
willing to concede on the IP issues was because the WTO established
the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). 81 The DSB was appealing to
76. Id.
77. Id. ¶ 4.A.
78. TRIPS art. 27, supra note 1.
79. The TRIPS Agreement and Pharmaceuticals, supra note 50, at 9, 19, 21.
80. See id. at 9, 11 (noting that after refusing to negotiate an agreement on
intellectual property for almost 3 years, developing countries finally agreed to this
tradeoff, and unfortunately most of them received less benefits than expected).
81. Id. at 9, 11.
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developing countries because it stopped the United States from using
Section 301 to retaliate against countries, 82 which were deemed as
non-compliant with adequate standards of IP by the U.S.
government. 83 In exchange for the market access and the DSB,
developing countries gave in on the issues of the patent-eligible
subject matter and patent term. The final version of the TRIPS
Agreement set the length of the patent term to a minimum of twenty
years, and this term equally applies to all industries. 84

III. ECONOMISTS’ SKEPTICISM ABOUT LONG,
UNIFORM PATENT TERMS
As with many issues, economists’ views on patents vary, so it is not
possible to cite to a clear consensus in this regard. 85 Nevertheless,
many economists have questioned the current patent system in relation
to both its length and scope of coverage. 86 In recent years, perhaps
because of strengthened protections, their criticisms have intensified.
Economic analysis of patent terms began in earnest in the late
1960’s through the work of William Nordhaus, who looked at the
“optimal patent life” and found that there was little effect on welfare
from extending patent terms beyond ten years. 87 Follow-up work by
F.M. Scherer proposed a flexible system under which patents would
initially be granted a shorter term, with extensions where needed. 88 He
believed that a flexible, product-specific patent term system would be
appropriate. 89 He noted that a good policy “would tailor the life of each
82. See id. at 9, 11–12 (recognizing that this expectation of developing countries
has not been fulfilled either because the United States continues to use Section 301).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 9, 21.
85. See, e.g., Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27
J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 3, 17 (2013), http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/
10.1257/jep.27.1.3 (discussing that while the political economy plays a key role in
this subject, economists surprisingly have had very little to say regarding the
understanding of why we have our current patent system).
86. Paul Klemperer, How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21
RAND J. ECON. 113, 113 (1990).
87. William D. Nordhaus, The Optimum Life of a Patent: Reply, 63 AM. ECON.
REV. 428, 428 (1972).
88. F.M. Scherer, Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometric
Reinterpretation, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 422, 422–23 (1972).
89. See id. at 426–27 (“A uniform policy of long-lived patent grants confers
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patent to the economic characteristics of its underlying invention,”
which could be achieved “through a flexible system of compulsory
licensing, under which the patent recipient bears the burden of
showing why his patent should not expire or be licensed at modest
royalties to all applicants three or five years after its issue.” 90
In the following years, various legal and economic scholars have
weighed in. Paul Klemperer, an economist at Oxford University,
suggested that “optimal patent policies vary across different classes of
products.” 91 In the late 1990s, economist Thomas Mandeville pointed
out the problem of a unified patent term system, in which he observed
that “[a] new perspective on the patent system, indeed a new theory of
the patent system is needed.” 92 In this regard, Mandeville suggested
taking into account of the “economic characteristics of information.” 93
Similarly, Lester Thurow questioned the rationality of providing an
equal patent duration to all inventions on the grounds that the
contribution and cost for each invention can be vastly different. 94 He
proposed an optimal patent system, which would take into account the
technology and income of the country, the industry, and the type of
knowledge. 95 For instance, he used electronics and pharmaceutical
invention as examples, with the former warranting a shorter term and
the latter deserving longer protection. He also believed that
“fundamental advances” and “logical extensions of existing
knowledge” should be treated differently. 96
More recently, a number of lawyers and economists have advocated
for flexible and shorter patent terms. Law professor Michael Carroll
excessive private rewards in these cases, compensated to some unknown extent by
the social benefits realized from low benefit-cost projects which otherwise would
not have been undertaken and by stimulus effects at the margin of projects which
would have been undertaken even with short patent lives.”).
90. Id. at 427.
91. See Klemperer, supra note 86, at 127 (emphasizing how we must be very
cautious about drawing policy conclusions from the simple model that this result
derived from).
92. THOMAS MANDEVILLE, UNDERSTANDING NOVELTY: INFORMATION,
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, AND THE PATENT SYSTEM 35 (1996).
93. Id. at 91.
94. Lester Thurow, Needed: A New System of Intellectual Property Rights, 75
HARV. BUS. REV. 95, 103 (1997).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 98.
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criticized the flat twenty-year patent term for all industries. 97 And in
his book Launching the Innovation Renaissance, economist Alex
Tabarrok also questioned the notion that all patents should be twenty
years long. 98 He suggests that:
[P]atents should be stronger in industries with high innovation-to-imitation
costs such as pharmaceuticals and weaker in industries with low
innovation-to-imitation costs such as software. Patents of say three, 10 and
12 years could be offered with the divisions either based on industry—with
software and business-method patents getting three years, pharmaceuticals
20 years, and other innovations 10 years—or based on evidence of sunk
costs. An innovator that wanted a three-year patent, for example, need not
offer any evidence on sunk costs and would receive a quick response.
Innovators applying for 10- and 20-year patents would have to provide
more information and would need to pass a higher hurdle. 99

In essence, the length of the term would be tied to the costs involved
in innovating. Patent terms of far less than twenty years will often be
sufficient. 100 Tabarrok has also stressed the importance of sunk costs
in determining patent duration. He points out that:
[P]atent law extends protection to many classes of innovations-including
software, medical procedures, and business processes as well as to many
vague ‘ideas’ – where innovation costs are low relative to imitation cost.
Unnecessary monopoly distortions and perhaps reduced innovation are the
result. A patent system based on the economic theory of patents would take
sunk costs into consideration – extending fewer protections when sunk
costs are low. Sunk costs could be taken into consideration in the allowing
of patentable product classes, in ruling on individual patents, in setting the

97. See Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in
Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 847 (2006) (“Applying a socially
costly uniform solution to problems of differing magnitudes means that the law
necessarily imposes uniformity cost by underprotecting those who invest, or would
invest, in certain costly innovations and overprotecting those with low innovation
costs or access to alternative appropriability mechanisms.”).
98. See ALEX TABARROK, LAUNCHING THE INNOVATION RENAISSANCE: A NEW
WAY TO BRING SMART IDEAS TO MARKET FAST 27 (2011) (considering the idea that
patents are supposed to incentivize inventions, but broad, vague claims and the
allowance of retroactively changing claims incentivizes the patenting and not the
invention).
99. Id.
100. See id. at 27–28 (noting that most countries already have a small patent
system in place that grants seven to ten year patents for small innovations).
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duration of patents, or in setting patent breadth. 101

Along the same lines, federal judge and legal scholar Richard
Posner also supports varying the patent term. In this regard, he has
stated that “U.S. patent law does not discriminate among types of
inventions or particular industries. This is, or should be, the most
controversial feature of that law. The reason is that need for patent
protection in order to provide incentives for innovation varies greatly
across industries.” 102 As an illustration, he notes some cases where a
shorter patent duration is warranted:
[P]harmaceuticals are the poster child for the patent system. But few
industries resemble pharmaceuticals in the respects that I’ve just described.
In most, the cost of invention is low; or just being first confers a durable
competitive advantage because consumers associate the inventing
company’s brand name with the product itself; or just being first gives the
first company in the market a head start in reducing its costs as it becomes
more experienced at producing and marketing the product; or the product
will be superseded soon anyway, so there’s no point to a patent monopoly
that will last 20 years; or some or all of these factors are present. Most
industries could get along fine without patent protection. . . . There are a
variety of measures that could be taken to alleviate the problems I’ve
described. They include reducing the patent term for inventors in industries
that do not have the peculiar characteristics of pharmaceuticals that I
described. 103

Other scholars focus on the length of patent term protection.
Economist Gary Becker has argued that “[t]he current patent length of
20 years (longer for drug companies) from the date of filing for a
patent can be cut in half without greatly discouraging innovation.”104
He observed that “[e]ven pharmaceutical and biotech companies, the
101. See Alex Tabarrok, Patent Theory versus Patent Law, 1 CONTRIBUTIONS TO
ECON.
ANALYSIS
&
POL’Y
1,
21–22
(2002),
https://mason.gmu.edu/~atabarro/PatentPublished.pdf (finding that changing the
breadth of patents would be the easiest for our current system to accommodate).
102. Richard Posner, Why There are Too Many Patents in America, ATLANTIC
(June 12, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/why-thereare-too-many-patents-in-america/259725/.
103. Id.
104. Gary Becker, On Reforming the Patent System, BECKER-POSNER BLOG (July
21, 2013), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2013/07/on-reforming-the-patentsystem-becker.html.
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main examples where patents are clearly necessary to encourage
innovation, usually do not need more than about a decade of monopoly
power to encourage their very large investments in new drugs.” 105 This
view is supported by law professor Brian Love, who noted the
negative impact of a long patent term:
In a world in which at least some products are out of date by the time they
hit store shelves, the last few years of a two-decade-long patent term seem
unlikely to incentivize greater innovation. To the contrary, it appears that
the waning years of patent protection primarily benefit litigation-oriented
patentees who do little more with their aging patent rights than impose steep
legal costs on those selling successful products. 106

In The Case Against Patents, economists Michele Boldrin and
David K. Levine offer a broader attack on patents:
Both theory and evidence suggest that while patents can have a partial
equilibrium effect of improving incentives to invent, the general
equilibrium effect on innovation can be negative. The historical and
international evidence suggests that while weak patent systems may mildly
increase innovation with limited side effects, strong patent systems retard
innovation with many negative side effects. 107

They note that “[p]atents are time limited, which makes it relatively
easy to phase them out by phasing in ever shorter patent durations.” 108
They also suggest that “[i]f the US economy is to have patents, we
may want to start tailoring their length and breadth to different sectoral
needs.” 109
Their conclusion is echoed in a recent Economist cover story, Time
to Fix Patents, which calls the current patent system a creator of “a
parasitic ecology of trolls and defensive patent-holders,” and calls for
a shorter patent term:
Patents also last too long. Protection for 20 years might make sense in the

105. Id.
106. Brian Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent
Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
1309, 1409 (2013).
107. Boldrin & Levine, supra note 85, at 3.
108. Id. at 18.
109. Id. at 19.
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pharmaceutical industry because to test a drug and bring it to market can
take more than a decade. But in industries like information technology, the
time from brain wave to production line, or line of code, is much shorter.
When patents lag behind the pace of innovation, firms end up with
monopolies on the building-blocks of an industry. . . . Even pharmaceutical
firms could live with shorter patents if the regulatory regime allowed them
to bring treatments to market sooner and for less upfront cost. 110

IV. CONCLUSION
More than twenty years after the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement,
discussions concerning patent terms have largely disappeared in the
international arena. However, economists continue to remind us of the
lack of an economic foundation for the current patent term system.
With regard to a variable patent term, a uniform patent system for
all products does have its upsides. For starters, the uniform system
reduces the administrative cost and simplifies the system. 111 Without
having to distinguish different characteristics of claimed inventions,
which can be abstract and obscure, the process will be more costeffective. 112 Political economy considerations also weigh in favor of
uniformity since it may increase the cost of rent seeking by individuals
and other interest groups. 113 In practice, it minimizes the chance for
competitors to game the system to attain the most favorable
treatment. 114
On the other hand, as noted above, many economists suggest that
110. Time
to
Fix
Patents,
ECONOMIST
(Aug.
8,
2015),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2015/08/08/time-to-fix-patents.
111. Michael W. Carroll, One Size Does Not Fit All: A Framework for Tailoring
Intellectual Property Rights, 70 OHIO ST. L. J. 1361, 1399 (2009).
112. See JAE HUN PARK, PATENTS AND INDUSTRY STANDARDS 162–63 (2010)
(recalling the high administrative costs involved with differential treatment and
recognizing that it is impossible to find the right length and scope of patents in each
industry); see also ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION
AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 204 (2004) (explaining the difficulty
in implementing differential treatment because of the inevitable tendency of
patentees to put themselves in the position of the most favorable treatment).
113. See Carroll, supra note 111, at 1398–99 (commenting that interest group
involvement in copyright and patent legislation has grown immensely in the last few
years).
114. JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 112, at 204.
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“discrimination” across sectors, instead of the current flat patent term,
can be beneficial. 115 They argue that economic welfare is improved if
elements such as difficulty, cost, benefit, and other characteristics of
the industry are taken into account when granting patent protection.
At the present time, there is no movement to reform the existing
system of patent terms. There are a few economists and lawyers who
write about this issue, but the larger public is not engaged in this
debate. The absence of a broad consensus for change makes reform
difficult. At the same time, there are widespread concerns about the
costs of pharmaceutical products. 116 Wide realization that long patent
terms lead to high costs of certain products could lead to changes to
the system
With regard to practical changes that might be made, as explained
above, economists’ critiques make various suggestions for reform, but
do not necessarily set out a concrete alternative for a domestic patent
term system. Thus, details of possible new domestic systems for patent
terms are lacking. However, while there is no fully fleshed out
replacement to draw on, and no comprehensive reform to propose,
there is a narrower path to making changes to the current system.
Under the TRIPS Agreement, the patent term must be at least twenty
years and must apply to all products. 117 If that requirement was
removed, governments would then have the discretion to experiment
with different domestic systems. In these circumstances, they could at
least begin to have a conversation about how patent terms might be
altered in welfare improving ways.

115. See discussion infra Part III (recalling that patents in varying industries
require different periods of protection in order to incentivize innovation).
116. See Tahir Amin, The Problem with High Drug Prices Isn’t ‘Foreign
Freeloading,’ It’s the Patent System, CNBC (June 27, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/25/high-drug-prices-caused-by-us-patentsystem.html (explaining that high costs of pharmaceutical products in the United
States are caused by the unfair pricing systems created from the strongest drug patent
monopolies at any point in the last century).
117. The TRIPS Agreement and Pharmaceuticals, supra note 50, at 9, 21.

